Hardware-Backed Identity
Each installation is enrolled against a real TPM 2.0 device and receives a hardware-bound identity.
SupportTPM gives Windows software a device-bound security foundation using TPM 2.0—without requiring each software vendor to build and operate its own TPM integration.
First used in SupportRMM, our remote monitoring and management platform for Windows.
First used in SupportRMMRead about the reference implementationEach installation is enrolled against a real TPM 2.0 device and receives a hardware-bound identity.
Trust is granted only after the platform proves possession of TPM-protected keys.
Applications request scoped cryptographic capabilities through a local agent instead of integrating raw TPM APIs.
SupportTPM is hardware-backed by design. Security software can build on.
Windows exposes powerful TPM primitives, but integrating them safely requires device enrollment, key lifecycle logic, IPC, cloud coordination and recovery rules. SupportTPM centralizes that work in one managed platform.
SupportTPM turns hardware trust into a sequence of operational controls that a software product can actually use.
The agent proves control of TPM-protected keys and receives a unique installation identity.
The enrolled installation is associated with the software deployment and its allowed capability policy.
The application requests the specific local capability required by a database, signing or internal security flow.
The protected workflow works only when the correct TPM-backed installation can reproduce the required capability.
SupportRMM uses SupportTPM to make core data flows depend on a TPM-derived application capability instead of a simple Boolean licence result.
SupportTPM is being validated inside SupportRMM before third-party integration is opened. This provides real operational feedback across Windows systems, different TPM hardware and daily application workloads.
The first implementation protects volatile application data. The same platform can support other product-specific security workflows as each lifecycle and recovery model is introduced.
Encrypt internal state or database fields so normal software operation depends on the enrolled device.
Reference implementationReplace a single patchable licence flag with application functions that require a valid hardware-backed capability.
Platform directionProtect selected configuration or content with device-bound encryption and an explicitly designed recovery policy.
Future capabilityEncrypted removable content can be restricted to an authorized machine when the product defines durable recovery requirements.
Future capabilityUse hardware-backed signing contexts for scripts, commands or product-specific records.
Product-specificAuthorize application or network operations based on an enrolled hardware identity rather than a copyable local secret.
Future integrationSupportTPM is being developed as a managed security service operated by SupportTPM. Software vendors integrate the application-facing layer; the platform manages enrollment, binding, lifecycle controls and audit.
The MVP is Windows-first because the reference implementation and current agent use Windows services, TPM 2.0 and local Named Pipe communication. This does not define the final platform as Windows-only.
Read the public technology notesThe current site documents the technology and its first real implementation. Commercial access, pricing and third-party onboarding will follow only after the platform is consolidated.